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I&M

COMMANDER AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
NAVAL AIR STATION, NORTH ISLAND
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO
FFA-1/AB5
SERIAL NO.

13716

80/23 AUG 1956

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VP-24 AAR ser 3-56 concerning FJ-3 BuNo 136153
accident occurring 30 April 1956, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (CP-57)
Via: Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VP-24 aircraft accident occurring 30 April 1956

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and in the remarks contained in the second and third endorsements.
2. This AAR reports only the fact that the pilot was involved in a collision with a target banner but omits the reason why. It concludes that the pilot used improper recovery technique, but fails to include a description and analysis of that technique. As submitted the report has no value in prevention of similar accidents which is the paramount reason for the submission of AAR's.
(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

By direction

Copy to:
BUAER (2)
CINCPACFLT
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CO, NAAS Fallon
COMHABs 11/12 MD
CO, VP-24
CVG-2

A25
FF7-2/A25-1
Ser: 322/ 3186

25 JUL 1956

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-24 AAR Ser 2-56 concerning FJ-3, 136152,
accident occurring 30 April 1956, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander Fleet Air Alameda
To: Chief of Naval Operations (CP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
 (2) U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-24 AAR Serial 2-56; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, and with the comments of the first endorsement as modified by the third endorsement.
2. Commander Fleet Air Alameda notes that there were excessive delays in the processing of this AAR by each endorser, except the second.

P. D. H. - C
Copy to:
CINCPACFLT
COMAINGPAC
NAVAVSAGEN (2)
NUAER (2)
BAR, COLUMBUS
NAAS FALLON
COMNARS TWELVE ADMIN
VF-24,
CAO-2

18119

NAB12-95-wm
A25/1
Ser: 95/370
16 July 1956

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-24 AAR Ser 2056 concerning FJ-3 BuNo 136152,
accident occurring on 30 April, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander, Naval Air Bases, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Alameda
 (2) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
 (3) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Subj: VF-24 AAR Serial 2-56; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the recommendations and conclusions of
the Aircraft Accident Board.

2. Commander, Naval Air Bases, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts concurs
with the comments and action indicated in the third endorsement.

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
BUAER
CINCPACFLT
NAVSAFcen
BAR Columbus
CO VF-24
CO NAAS Fallon

90:JAJ:ly

A25

Serial

971

JUN 27 1956

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VF-24 AAR Ser 2-56 Concerning FJ-3 BuNo 138163
accident occurring on 30 April 1956. Pilot (b)
(b) (6) LTJG, USN (c)

From: Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Fallon, Nev.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander, Naval Air Bases, Eleventh/Twelfth Naval Districts
(2) Commander, Fleet Air Alameda
(3) Commander, Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
(4) Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-24 AAR Serial 2-56; forwarding of

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Ser 2661P50 of 4 May 1956
(b) CNO msg 072018Z of June 1956

1. Forwarded, concurring with the recommendations and conclusions of the Aircraft Accident Board.

2. The first endorsement is concurred in with exception to that section pertaining to placing an additional helicopter plus TBM or similar type aircraft at the City of Gerlach. It is not considered feasible at this time to station any type aircraft away from the Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Fallon, due to the logistic support requirements for the aircraft and crew, lack of suitable type helicopters, and qualified helicopter pilots. It is considered however, that the HO4S-3 now assigned and the additional HUP-2 (which will total 2) allowed this activity by reference (b) will provide continuous uninterrupted SAR service. Arrangements for a centrally located helicopter and crew are underway for augmentation when the HUS-1 is received as discussed in paragraph 3, and an additional helicopter pilot is available.

3. Reference (a) provided for the replacement of the HUP-2 with an HUS-1 of higher performance which will permit greater utility at the relative high elevations peculiar to the Fallon area. It is expected that the performance of the HUS-1 will make possible arrival, with the doctor aboard, within one hour to the furthest point of the gunnery ranges and target areas, and a return to the Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Fallon, within two and one-half hours.

J. H. Armstrong
J. H. ARMSTRONG

Copy to:
COMMAND 12 (Admin)
VF-24

4

ORIGINAL

FF12/CVG-2
A25
Ser: 75
29 MAY 1956

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VF-24 AAR serial 2-56 concerning FJ-3 BuNo 136152,
accident occurring 30 April, pilot [redacted] (b) (6)

From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWO
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer NAS Fallon
(2) Commander Naval Air Bases, Twelfth Naval District
(3) Commander Fleet Air Alameda
(4) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(5) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VF-24 AAR serial 2-56; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and the comments and recommendations of the first endorsee.

2. The recommendation of the Aircraft Accident Board regarding corrections to banner tracking while in firing range is particularly worthy of emphasis. The aircraft fire control system employed in the FJ-3 is incapable of a correct solution of all variables if the pilot is not tracking smoothly for at least two seconds prior to reaching effective firing range. Obviously, with a closing speed of approximately 600 feet per second, a correction by the pilot after reaching firing range will be ineffective since the computing elements of the system will not have had sufficient time to reflect an accurate solution. If the foregoing is well understood by pilots using this system, and they are made aware that hit percentage will in all probability be lessened by such tracking procedures, it is considered that there will be less tendency to improve an initially bad pass. Consequently this should lessen the probability of banner collision.

3. Attention is invited to VF-63 AAR serial 1-56 and endorsements thereto concerning additional discussion of the rescue facilities available at NAS Fallon.

Hudieichauer
H. W. NICHOLSON

Copy to:
BUAUER (2)
CINCPACFLT
NAVAL AVIATION (2), Direct
SAM Columbus
SOMALIA/ALAMEDA, Safety Council/Recorder
NO. VF-24

ORIGINAL

Fighter Squadron TWENTY FOUR
Cape of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

VR-24/A25

WIA: ed

SORI: 306

21 MAY 1956

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VR-24 AAR Ser 2-56 concerning FJ-3 BuNo 136152, accident occurring 30 April 1956, Pilot (b) (6), LTJG, USN.

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group, TWO
(2) Commanding Officer Naval Air Auxiliary Station, Fallon, Nevada
(3) Commander U.S. Naval Air Bases Twelfth Naval District
(4) Commander Fleet Air Alameda
(5) Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(6) Director, Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VR-24 AAR Ser 2-56; forwarding of

1. Forwarded concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the aircraft accident board.
2. Rescue facilities available to a Naval Aviator downed in the Black Rock Desert gunnery area are at best, meager. In this case the pilot parachuted to SHAWAVE at approximately 1330T. Expedited dispatching of the air rescue helicopter by NAAS FALCON effected a rescue at 1545T, a total time of two (2) hours and fifteen minutes. The helicopter then proceeded to WINNEBUCCA, NEVADA where the pilot was picked up by ZEM and returned to NAAS FALCON arriving at 2030, some seven (7) hours later. Had this pilot been injured it is most probable the total time would have been reduced approximately two (2) hours. Allowing the two (2) hour reduction in rescue time, five (5) hours to return a pilot with a minor cut or broken bone could mean the difference in his survival or not.
3. It is most highly recommended that rescue facilities at NAAS FALCON be expanded to preclude excessive rescue time. An additional helicopter, plus a ZEM or similar type aircraft placed at the city of GENEVA would more than halve rescue time and could serve a dual purpose should the SHAWAVE range be opened. There is no standard to measure the value of human life, but the rescue of one injured pilot would more than compensate for monies used to expand NAAS FALCON rescue facilities.

Copy to:
NAVAL AIRCRAFT DIRECTOR
NAVAL DIRECTOR
COMBATAIR TWO
NAAS FALCON
COMNAVAIR 12
COMUSNAVALFLEET
COMNAVAIR

ORIGINAL

6

THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD SHALL SUBMIT THIS REPORT TO THE C.G. OF THE ACTIVITY CONDUCTING THE INVESTIGATION. IT SHALL THEN BE FORWARDED BY THE C.G. IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT AAF INSTRUCTIONS.

1. DATE OF ACCIDENT	2. HOUR	3. ACTIVITY SUBMITTING REPORT	4. AIR SERIAL NO.	
20 April 1966	1320 T	FITRON TWENTY FOUR	2-56	
5. MODEL A/C	6. HOUR	7. CHECK DAMAGE TO A/C	8. REPORTING COMMANDER OF A/C	
FJ-3	130152Z	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	FITRON TWENTY FOUR	
9. NAME OF UNIT OPERATING THE A/C	10. BASED AT	11. OPERATIONAL CHIEF OF COMMAND	12. UNIT NUMBER	
FITRON TWENTY FOUR	MAAS Fallon	CORPORAL ALAMEDA, COMATRIPAC, CNO	CVG-2,	
13. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT	14. TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENT	15. UNIT NUMBER	16. UNIT NUMBER	
Black Rock Desert	Temporary Deployment	Operations	OPERATOR ATTACHED	
Lat. 41° 18' N Lon. 118° 39' W Restricted area (R-266)			FITRON TWENTY FOUR	
17. PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including name and injury code of those injured, not occupants of A/C)				
A. FULL NAME, RANK, SERVICE, FILE NO. (Listed Person in control first)	B. AGE	C. BILLET	D. POSITION	E. INJURY
(b) (6) LBJG, (b) (6) /1310		Pilot	Deckpit	D

18. PILOT EXPERIENCE	TOTAL ALL MODELS	TOTAL THIS MODEL	LAST 12 MONTHS ALL MODELS	LAST 3 MONTHS ALL MODELS	LAST 3 MONTHS THIS MODEL	INSTRUMENT RATING
TOTAL HOURS	1094.8	168.7	233.5	123.5	119.2	Std/No/No
INSTRUMENT HOURS			43.4	10.3	5.3	PILOT'S AGE
FIGHT HOURS			24.1	10.6	10.6	(b)
BY MISSIONS DAY/NITE			11	0	0	DATE DESIGNATED

19. CHECK IF APPLICABLE. CODES OR INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	20. PURPOSE OF FLIGHT	CODE	21. TIME IN FLIGHT
<input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/> NOT INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	Air to Air Gunnery	1404 0 + 24

22. TYPE OF ACCIDENT	CODE	23. MANEUVER INVOLVED
Collision (low banner)	A	Gunnery Run

24. WEATHER	CEILING	VISIBILITY	25. DARKNESS	26. CLEARANCE ISSUED
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VFR	<input type="checkbox"/> IFR	Unlimited	50+	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO Local VFR

27. WIND DIRECTION	FORCE	28. ATTITUDE ON IMPACT	ANGLE OF IMPACT	STOPPING DISTANCE SPEED ON IMPACT	29. DID FIRE FOLLOW IMPACT?
-	-	Nose down	80°	0 feet 400 kts.	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

20. AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE DATA (Fill in all data in every case of material failure or malfunction, actual or suspected)

HISTORY	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	FLT HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL	FLT HOURS SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE OF CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLT HOURS SINCE CHECK	NO. DAYS SINCE CHECK
AIRCRAFT	1	1	0	163.1	149.0	1st Maj. 28.3	8	
MODEL	SERIAL NO.							
ENGINE	OF ENGINE							
ENGINE 1								
ENGINE 2								
ENGINE 3								
ENGINE 4								

30. HAS THIS A/C BEEN DAMAGED IN PREVIOUS ACCIDENT(S) DURING PRESENT SERVICE TOUR?	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	31. IF YES, GIVE DATE(S) OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENT(S)	32. SHOW SERIAL NUMBER OF THIS ACCIDENT, IF SUBMITTED
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33. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS (Check or fill in only one primary "P" factor; all others secondary "S")	P	S	P	S
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<input type="checkbox"/> PILOT OR CREW ERROR	<input type="checkbox"/> MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION
<input type="checkbox"/> ERROR OF OTHER PERSONNEL	

34. CHECK CONDITIONS INVOLVED IN THIS ACCIDENT (List of A's)	<input type="checkbox"/> E-WIND, STAGGER, OBLITERATE, TURBULENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> PITCHING OR ROLLING DIVE	<input type="checkbox"/> COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTY	<input type="checkbox"/> AIRPORT HAZARD	<input type="checkbox"/> ROUGH SEA	<input type="checkbox"/> TERRAIN CONDITIONS
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35. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS	<input type="checkbox"/> HIGH-G FORCED LANDING	<input type="checkbox"/> PRECAUTIONARY LANDING	<input type="checkbox"/> ENGINE FAILURE	<input type="checkbox"/> FUEL EXHAUSTION OR REAR EXHAUSTION
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36. PERSONNEL SAFETY EQUIPMENT USED	<input type="checkbox"/> PARACHUTE	<input type="checkbox"/> EJECTION SEAT	<input type="checkbox"/> SHOULDER HARNESS	<input type="checkbox"/> SAFETY BELT	<input type="checkbox"/> PROTECTIVE HELMET	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER EQUIP.
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37. MEDICAL OFFICER REPORT SERIAL NUMBER	
<input type="checkbox"/> LIST	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER

38. DISTRIBUTION BY COMMANDERS OFF.	39. DISTRIBUTION BY COMMANDERS OFF.
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(29) THE ACCIDENT

On 30 April 1956 at 1253T LTJG. (b) (6)

(b) (6) /1310 USN, was airborne in FJ-3 BuNo 136152 in company with two (2) other FJ-3 aircraft on a routine gunnery flight from NAS FALLON, NEVADA. At approximately 1320T during his fourth (4th) gunnery run LTJG. (b) (6) collided with the banner. The aircraft went out of control, described in enclosures (1), (2), (3), and (4) as appearing like a series of fast rudder rolls. LTJG. (b) (6) ejected when he was unable to regain control. No voice transmissions were heard from LTJG. (b) (6) after colliding with the banner. LCDR (b) (6) inspected the tow plane for damage and then descended to orbit LTJG. (b) (6) position on the ground. LTJG. (b) (6) climbed to 30,000 feet to relay information to NAS FALLON. Air rescue helicopter was dispatched to the scene at 1350 from NAS FALLON. The pilot was picked up at 1545.

(30) DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The aircraft struck the ground at an estimated angle of 80 degrees nosedown and disintegrated upon impact.

(31) THE INVESTIGATION

The investigation of the accident revealed the following facts:

- a. LTJG. (b) (6) was on a scheduled air to air gunnery training flight from NAS FALLON.
- b. LTJG. (b) (6) had a total of 1094.8 hours, 168.7 of which were in FJ-3 type aircraft. This FJ-3 time was while with VF-24.
- c. LTJG. (b) (6) had satisfactorily completed the gunnery course at Fleet Air Gunnery Unit, NAS El Centro, California.
- d. LTJG. (b) (6) completed twenty five (25) gunnery training flights in the FJ-3.
- e. LTJG. (b) (6) is considered an excellent pilot.
- f. Facts pertinent to the gunnery flight on 30 April 1956.

- (1) Ceiling and visibility unlimited.
- (2) The gunnery flight was conducted under prescribed procedures.
- (3) LTJG. (b) (6) had completed three (3) gunnery runs during the flight prior to the accident.
- (4) The aircraft went out of control after colliding with the banner. LTJG. (b) (6) ejected. The aircraft was spinning when last seen by LTJG. (b) (6) as stated in enclosure (4).

g. The aircraft struck the ground in about 80 degrees nosedown attitude and disintegrated upon impact. Investigation of the area indicated an explosion (see enclosure (5) which shows two areas of debris) but there was no evidence of fire. Debris was thrown forward along the flight path and to the left about 130 degrees from the flight path.

h. The starboard aileron and flap were fairly intact with no definite indication of being struck by the tow bar.

i. The film from the flight was retrieved and developed. Enclosure (7) shows the tracking sequence of the gunnery run during which the collision occurred.

j. The collision occurred at about 1320. The rescue helicopter was dispatched at 1350 and arrived on the scene at 1345. Squadron aircraft from VF-24 and VF-64 orbited the area to spot the downed pilot and to direct the helicopter to the scene. The helicopter delivered the pilot to WINNEMUCCA, Nevada, where the pilot was picked up and delivered to NAAS FALON at 2030 by THM.

(52) THE ANALYSIS

The gunnery pattern was the standard training pattern employed in air to air gunnery for jet aircraft. The pilot had had ample indoctrination in the proper technique to be employed.

After colliding with the banner the aircraft went out of control and into a spin. The pilot ejected safely. The plane disintegrated upon impact with the ground.

LTCG. (b) (6) is an ambitious pilot with a strong desire to excel all others in ability and flight time. These motivations seem to have had a bearing on this accident in that the pilot was overly intent upon tracking the banner and scoring a high number of hits.

(33) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Conclusions:

- (1) Pilot error is considered the primary cause of this accident, in that improper recovery technique was employed in the gunnery run.
- (2) Control of the aircraft was lost after the collision with the banner.
- (3) Rescue facilities at NAAS FALCON are inadequate.

b. Recommendations:

- (1) It is recommended that all phases of the gunnery training pattern be covered in each briefing. Include in the briefing that corrections cannot be made to get on and track the banner when within firing range and safely recover from the runs.

At 1206 on 30 April 1956 I took off from NAF Fallon on a scheduled LA64 gunnery hon to be performed at 20,000 feet over Black Rock desert. I was number 3 man in the flight of three. The take off, rendezvous, and flight to the gunnery range were carried out as briefed.

Upon reaching the range the tow plane was spotted and a flyby was made. My first run was normal with a maximum of 4 G's. I didn't fire on this run. On my next run I was too close in the perch so I didn't fire on this run. I pulled 5G G's.

On my forth run I was in a good perch position and the run was good. At 2000 feet I got the oral tone from the gun sight. I was tracking good and when I thought I was in firing range I opened fire. My pipper started to drift above the banner. I made a correction and then broke off. The break off seemed normal and I thought I had hit the slip stream of the tow plane. Immediately after the break off the aircraft started a fast starboard roll. at this time I heard someone say "He got the banner". I tried to recover from the starboard roll and the aircraft seemed to settle down for a few seconds, and then it snapped back into the starboard roll. I then decided to leave the aircraft. I have no idea of my altitude. I placed my feet in the stirrups and reached for the curtain. I got my left hand on the curtain with no difficulty, but had trouble getting my right hand up. The G's were both positive and negative. I estimate my speed at 350 kts. indicated. In the bailout I didn't have my shoulder harness locked and I didn't disconnect my oxygen hose or radio plugs. I pulled the curtain and the next thing I knew I was falling clear of the aircraft. I cleared myself of the seat and then pulled the rip cord. Somewhere in the fall I lost my helmet. The fall was normal and just before touching down I disconnected my chest and leg straps. I hit the ground very easy and never lost my balance nor fell. I slipped from the parachute immediately.

I spread my chute out on the ground and then turned up the red side of my poncho on the ground. I then made in big letters OK by digging the ground with the heel of my shoe. I then sat down and waited until the rescue helicopter arrived.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

STATEMENT OF LCDR (b) (6)

A division flight consisting of LTJG (b) (6) number 2 section leader in FJ-3 BuNo 136152, LTJG (b) (6) 1st. wingman in FJ-3 BuNo 136088, and myself as division leader in FJ-3 BuNo 136146, launched from NAAS Fallon, Nevada, on a 1A64 firing gunnery hop at 1255, 30 April 1956.

Rendezvous was made over Trego, Nevada, with Jackstay 42 our assigned tow target plane, at approximately 1310. Jackstay 42 proceeded on a course through the Black Rock Gunnery area of 010 magnetic at 30,000 feet. Four firing gunnery runs were made from the starboard on this course and on this run FJ Bureau number 136152 flew into the tow banner. Jackstay 42 called on tactical frequency stating his tow had been struck. I was nearing the perch position at 25,000 feet and a distance of 5000 feet laterally from the tow plane when the above transmission was received. On completion of a hard turn I saw number three plane in what appeared to be a series of right aileron rolls and 020° nose down attitude. I immediately transmitted on tactical frequency for the pilot to bailout. Jackstay 42 transmitted that the pilot had ejected and his chute was open. Jackstay 42 stated his plane was acting peculiar so I flew over and visually inspected his plane. No visual damage was observed. I then proceeded to the area of the parachute and covered the pilot during his descent. The pilot landed and gave an OK signal and later laid out his, parachute, signal cover and marked an OK in the sand. I departed the area at 1430 after a relief plane had arrived on the scene. Aircraft 136152 exploded upon contact with the terrain. The approximate position of wreckage is 118° 39' W 41° 18' North.

(b) (6)

STATEMENT OF LTNG (b) (6)

at 1255 on 4 April 1958 our division took off on a LA64 firing gunnery hop. The flight to Black Rock gunnery range was uneventful and took about 15 minutes. We spotted the tow plane Jackstay 42 and had him trail his sleeve. The tow started up the range immediately and about 4 firing runs had been made up the range. My position was number two in 103 with LCDR (b) (6) in 106 and LTNG (b) (6) in 114. As No. 2, I had just pulled off a run heading towards the perch. When I reversed going over to the perch I saw LTNG (b) (6) aircraft in a rapid right aileron roll just aft of the tow plane. The tow pilot called that someone had hit the banner and being obvious that LTNG (b) (6) plane was out of control, I called for him to bailout. Jackstay 42 called that the pilot was out, then that his parachute was open. I was instructed to gain altitude to act as radio relay and LCDR (b) (6) examined Jackstay 42 for damage. Finding the tow plane in good condition, LCDR (b) (6) instructed him to detach and proceed to the base. The accident occurred at about 1335, I called NAAS FALCON tower on guard. I informed them of the crash and location of the pilot and assisted in rescue operation at 30,000 feet. Upon being relieved on station by LT (b) (6) in 112, I proceeded to NAAS FALCON and upon spotting LCDR (b) (6) flew wing on him to the base. We taxied into the flight line at 1450.

(b) (6)

STATEMENT OF LTJO (b) (6)

On the 1245 tow hop for VF-24 I took off at 1230 and arrived over Trego, Nevada at 1250. I made contact with the flight and streamed my banner. We proceeded up the range at 30,000 feet. At the North end of the range I informed the leader that he had time for one more run. No. 2 called off and No. 3 in. Shortly after No. 3 called in I felt a jolt and my aircraft began accelerating. I came up on the radio and informed the flight that somebody had got the banner. At first I thought it had been shot off. The next thing I heard was one of the other aircraft telling No. 3 to "get out". I looked out and down to the starboard and saw the aircraft, wings level, nose down. Shortly after that the aircraft started to roll and lose something from under the wings. It could have been gas from one of his wing tanks. About the time he entered the roll the canopy came off and the pilot ejected. I watched him come out of the aircraft, part from the seat, and his chute open.

About this time my aircraft began yawing and pitching. I dropped the remains of the banner and called the leader. He inspected my aircraft and could see no damage. I asked if I could be any help and was told no. I returned to NAS Fallon and landed at 1335. At no time did I see the aircraft in "the run".

(b) (5)

(b) (6)


Certified to be a True Copy
(b) (6)

11



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17

ENCLOSURE 25